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Collecting the Prejudices 
For over a century the Oxford English Dictionary has defined "enlighten- 
ment" as follows: 
1. The action of enlightening; the state of being enlightened ... 
[Ilmparting or receiving mental or spiritual light. 
2. Sometimes used [after Ger. Aufilarung, Aufilarerei] to designate 
the spirit and aims of the French philosophers of the 18th c., or of 
others whom it is intended to associate with them in the implied charge 
of shallow and pretentious intellectualism, unreasonable contempt for 
tradition and authority, etc.' 
The second definition has, understandably, not sat well with historians of the 
period. More than four decades ago, Peter Gay began a dissection of the persis- 
tence of various "stubborn misreadings" of the Enlightenment by noting that 
the virtually identical definition in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary had 
the dubious distinction of "collecting most current prejudices in one conve- 
nient spot."2 
A version of this article was presented at meetings of the American Society for Eighteenth- 
Century Studies, New Orleans, Louisiana, 19 April 200 1. The author thanks David Armitage, 
Darrin McMahon, and Ken Haynes for their comments. 
' The definition dates from 189 1 and has survived, unchanged, into the recently released on- 
line third edition. 
Peter Gay, The Party of Humanity (Princeton, 1959), 263. 
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The OED provided three examples of the second usage. The first two came 
from James Hutchison Stirling's Secret of Hegel (1865): 1) "Deism, Atheism, 
Pantheism, and all manner of isms due to Enlightenment" and 2) "Shallow 
Enlightenment, supported on such semi-information, on such weak personal 
vanity, etc." The third came from Edward Caird's Critical Philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant (1889): 3) "The individualistic tendencies of the age of En- 
lightenment." The OED's choice of examples has also raised some hackles 
among dix-huitizmistes. John Lough observed, "What these examples have to 
do with French thought it is difficult to see; the first source is a book on Hegel 
and the second one on Kant."3 
A glance at the context from which the Caird quotation was taken would 
have been enough to ease Lough's confusion. While Caird's book may have 
been about Kant, the passage quoted was part of a general characterization of 
eighteenth-century philosophy: 
The individualistic tendencies of the age of Enlightenment, which sepa- 
rated each man from the unity of the social organism to which he be- 
longed, separated him also from the past out of which his intellectual 
life had grown. Hence to the writers of that time the independence of 
philosophical thought seemed to involve that each thinker must begin 
the work of speculation de novo: and to admit the possibility or neces- 
sity of a mediation of truth to the individual by the communis sensus of 
humanity was in their eyes the same thing as to accept the dictation of 
an external a~thor i ty .~  
While there is much here that might be criticized, such a characterization of the 
Enlightenment still enjoys support in some quarters today. 
A closer look at the examples from The Secret of Hegel, however, yields a 
few surprises. For in the first extract the OED misquoted Stirling and in the 
second it misrepresented how he employed the phrase "shallow enlightenment." 
Both examples are taken from a passage in the book's Preface which launches 
a diatribe against Henry Thomas Buckle, whose materialist approach to history 
particularly incensed Stirling. At issue in the first is the question of whether 
Buckle-who conveyed to Stirling "the air of a man who is speaking by antici- 
pation, and who only counts on verifying the samem-truly understood Kant's 
work. The passage runs as follows (the portion extracted, and misquoted, by 
the OED has been italicized): 
' John Lough, "Reflections on Enlightenment and Lumieres," British Journal for Eigh- 
teenth-Century Studies, 8 (1985), 1-15, 1. 
Edward Caird, The Critical Philosophy oflmmanuel Kant (Glasgow, 1889), 69,46-53; cf. 
Caird, Hegel (Philadelphia, 1883), 15 which observes that Hegel's thought evolved from a study 
of Greek literature "and the so-called Enlightenment of the eighteenth century." 
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He had a theory, had Mr Buckle, or, rather, a theory had him-a theory, 
it is true, small rather, but still a theory that to him loomed huge as the 
universe, at the same time that it was the single drop of vitality in his 
whole soul.-Now, that such redoubted thinkers as Kant and Hegel, 
who, in especial, had been suspected or accused of Deism, Atheism, 
Pantheism, and all manner of isms dear to Enlightenment, but hateful 
to Prejudice-(or vice versa)-that these should be found not to fit 
into his theory-such doubt never for a moment crossed even the most 
casual dream of B ~ c k l e ! ~  
In the passage misquoted in the OED Stirling speaks not of "isms due to En-
lightenment" but rather of "isms dear to Enlightenment." The notion that "En- 
lightenment" holds Deism, Atheism, Pantheism dear, while "Prejudice" finds 
them hateful conforms to conventional notions about the Enlightenment and 
echoes Hegel's account in the Phenomenology of Spirit of the struggle between 
"enlightenment" and "s~perstition."~ Since "enlightenment" denounces as "su- 
perstition" everything that the faithful hold dear, it is hardly surprising that 
Stirling suggests that "Deism, Atheism, Pantheism" are "dear to Enlighten- 
ment" but "hateful to Prejudice." 
The difficulties with the passage rest less with what the OED misquotes 
than with what it leaves out: Stirling's equivocal "or vice versa." One way of 
making sense of this reversal is to read "Enlightenment" in the first of the 
OED's two senses-"imparting or receiving mental or spiritual lightu-rather 
than the second. In its non-religious sense (as "mental" rather than "spiritual" 
light) Enlightenment is kin to "Deism, Atheism, Pantheism" and will be viewed 
with revulsion by the faithful (who will be regarded by the enlightened, in turn, 
as the victims of prejudice). But since Stirling implies that it is Buckle-a man 
who is a victim of his own "anticipations" and who finds in texts only what he 
presumes he will find there-who is prejudiced, it is possible to reverse the 
relationship, thus making Deism, Atheism, and Pantheism "dear" to prejudiced 
souls like Mr. Buckle and hateful to the spiritually enlightened. Thus, while 
Stirling likely associated Buckle with any number of "isms" that, allegedly, 
were dear to French philosophers of the eighteenth century, the relationship of 
"Enlightenment" to these "isms" is quite unstable: it can regard them as either 
"dear" or as "hateful." 
The second example is buried in the midst of a passage that speculates on 
what would have happened had Buckle actually understood the German au- 
James Hutchison Stirling, The Secret of Hegel, Being the Hegelian System in Origin, 
Principle, Form, and Matter, "New Edition, Carefully Revised" (Edinburgh, 1898), xxxii. 
Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, ed. Eva Moldenauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frank- 
furt, 1970), 400-424. 
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thors he claimed to have read (again, the portions extracted by the OED have 
been italicized): 
In other words, if Mr. Buckle did penetrate the Germans, he found that 
there was nothing left him but to burn every vestige of that shallow 
Enlightenment which, supported on such semi-information, on such 
weakpersonal vanity, amid such hollow raisonnement, and with such 
contradictory results, he had been tempted, so boyishly ardent, so vain- 
gloriously pompous, to communicate-to a world in many of its mem- 
bers so ignorant, that it hailed a crude, conceited boy (of formal ability, 
quick conscientiousness, and the pang of Illumination-inherited prob-
ably from antecedents somewhere) as a "Vast Genius," and his work- 
a bundle of excerpts of mere Illumination, from a bundle of books of 
mere Illumination, disposed around a ready-made presupposition of 
mere Illumination-as a "Magnificent Contribution," fmit of "Vast 
Learning," and even "Phil~sophy."~ 
In this passage, the OED's excisions make it appear that Stirling regards "the 
Enlightenment" as "shallow." But when read in context, the thrust of the pas- 
sage is that Buckle-"crude, conceited" lad that he is-has only a very limited 
understanding of philosophical matters: had he actually understood Kant, he 
would have had to reject the "shallow Enlightenment" he had attained. Stirling's 
point, then, is that it is Buckle who is "shallow," not something called "the 
Enlightenment." What is particularly striking about these two passages-aside 
from the staggeringly digressive style in which Stirling couched his attack-is 
that neither of them uses the term "Enlightenment" in the way that Caird would 
a quarter of a century later. In neither passage does "Enlightenment" refer to a 
philosophical movement associated with a particular historical period. When 
Stirling needs to do that, he makes use of other words. 
The English term Stirling employs to designate those philosophical ten- 
dencies associated with the eighteenth-century philosophes is "Illumination," 
not "Enlightenment." The attack on Buckle, for example, is preceded by a dis- 
missal of Ludwig Feuerbach and David Friedrich Strauss as "an inferior 
Atheistico-Materialist set" who constitute the "remnants of the Au$'cIarung, of 
Eighteenth Century Ill~mination."~ "still knew nothing and would Buckle-who 
know nothing but the Illuminationn-is placed among their ranks.9 However, 
Stirling's favorite term for referring to eighteenth-century philosophy is not an 
English word at all. The German Aufklarung appears throughout the Preface to 
The Secret of Hegel and while a reader will search Stirling in vain for "the 
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Enlightenment," the macaronic formulation "the Aufklarung" can be found quite 
often.I0 
Stirling's use of terms may be odd, but it is not capricious. "Enlighten- 
ment"-used sparingly and never with a definite article--denotes an activity 
that, for lack of a better description, involves "imparting or receiving mental or 
spiritual light": the first meaning noted by the OED, not the second.ll "Illumi- 
nation" is sometimes used in this sense as well, though Stirling tends to use it, 
more particularly, to designate those philosophical tendencies associated with 
the French philosophes (i.e., the second of the two definitions of "Enlighten- 
ment" in the OED)-hence his use of the formulation "the Ill~mination."~~ But
his favorite term for referring to this collection of attitudes is the German 
Aufklarung. It is as if Stirling regarded the word as uniquely capable of desig- 
nating one of those things that-like Gemiitlichkeit and Schadenfreude--only 
Germans fully appreciate. 
The sense that Aufklarung designated something for which English did not 
have a word was not confined to Stirling. Eight years earlier, when John Sibree 
translated Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History into English, he found 
himself stymied by a section that bore the title "Die Aufklarung und die Revo- 
lution." He translated Aufilarung with the French "eclaircissement," explain- 
ing in a footnote that 
There is no current term in English denoting that great intellectual 
movement which dates from the first quarter of the eighteenth century, 
and which, if not the chief cause, was certainly the guiding genius of 
the French Revolution. The word "Illuminati" (signifying the mem- 
bers of an imaginary confederacy for propagating the open secret of 
the day), might suggest "Illumination," as an equivalent for the Ger- 
man "Aufklarung": but the French "~claircissement" conveys a more 
specific idea.13 
Stirling held that the word had been "badly rendered" by Sibree,I4 and his 
fellow Hegelians seemed to have agreed. For much of the nineteenth century, 
'O For a particularly striking example, see ibid., liv: "The principle of the Aujklarung, the 
Right of Private Judgment, is a perfectly true one, but it is not true as used by the Aujklarung, or 
it is used only one-sidedly by the Aujklarung." 
See, for example, ibid., xxxiv-xxxv. 
l 2  One of the remaining two uses of "enlightenment" in the Preface employs the term as a 
synonym for "Illumination" understood as an activity, not a period: "Auflclarung, Illumination, 
Enlightenment, destroyed Greece; it lowered man from Spirit to Animal ..." (Ivii). The remaining 
use of "enlightenment" likewise employs the term to as a name for a process: "When Enlighten- 
ment admits at all the necessity of control, the what and how far of this control can be argued out 
from this necessity-and self-will is abandoned" (liii). 
l 3  Hegel, Philosophy ofHistoly, tr. J .  Sibree (New York, 19562), 438. 
l 4  For Stirling's judgment on Sibree, see his essay "Lord Macaulay," Jerrold, Tennyson, and 
Macaulay with Other Critical Essays, ed. James Hutchison Stirling (Edinburgh, 1868), 121. 
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Hegel's translators and commentators either used "Illumination" to render 
AuJklarung or simply left the word untranslated.I5 It was not until J. B. Baillie's 
1910translation of the Phenomenology that "Enlightenment" consistently trans- 
lates AuJklarung in any of Hegel's worksi6 Thus, it would appear that the 
Oxford English Dictionary has only one valid example of a use of "Enlighten- 
ment" to designate "the spirit and aims of the French philosophers of the 18th 
c." The example, from Caird, is virtually contemporaneous with the publica- 
tion of the dictionary. While the passages from Stirling express a distaste for 
attitudes and activities associated with the period that we have come to desig- 
nate as "the Enlightenment," the term "enlightenment" has a rather minor role 
in Stirling's account and is never preceded by the tell-tale article "the."17 
This absence is easily overlooked. It is all too easy to see the definition in 
the OED as evidence of a long battle between "the Enlightenment" and "the 
Counter-Enlightenment."18 But this assumption conceals the extent to which, 
at the time the OED attempted its definition, "the Enlightenment" lacked the 
identity that it has come to have for us. Hence the curious character of the 
definitions in the OED. In the second, the OED seems to be referring less to 
"the Enlightenment" as a particular historical period than to a more general 
project born in the eighteenth century but reaching beyond it. Thus the OED 
offers definitions of "enlightenment" as a process ("imparting or receiving 
mental or spiritual light") and as a project ("the spirit and aims of the French 
philosophers of the 18th century"), but not yet as a period ("the Enlighten- 
ment"). 
To understand how "Enlightenment" came to take on a particular reference 
(as a term used to refer to a particular historical period) and a particular set of 
resonances (as "shallow and pretentious intellectualism" and "an unreasonable 
contempt for tradition and authority"), we must look more carefully at the com- 
plex relationship between a variety of ways of characterizing the eighteenth 
century, a relationship that the OED sought to summarize, somewhat prema- 
l 5  George S. Morris opted for "Illumination" as a translation for Aujklarung in the summary 
of the argument of the Philosophy of History in Hegel k Philosophy of the State and of Histoty 
(Chicago, 1887), 292. The 1896 translation of Hegel's Lectures on the History ofPhilosophy by 
E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson for the most part left the German Aufklarung untranslated, 
but rendered its appearance in the title of the last chapter of Part 111, Section I1 as "The German 
Illumination." 
l6  Caird's Hegel uses "Enlightenment" in passing as a translation for Aujklarung in the 
translation of a passage from one of Hegel's Tiibingen manuscripts, 23. 
l 7  J. G. A. Pocock, "The Tell-Tale Article: Reconstructing ... Enlightenment" (Plenary Ad- 
dress to the 29th annual meeting of the American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies, Uni- 
versity of Notre Dame, 2 April 1998). 
See, for example, Roy Porter's comments on the "English philistinism" and "Oxonian 
deference to 'authority and tradition' " that he finds in the definition. The Creation of the Mod- 
ern World: The Untold Story of the British Enlightenment (New York, 2000), 4-5. 
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turely, at the close of the nineteenth century. This will involve, first, a brief 
survey of some of the other terms that the nineteenth century used when talking 
about the eighteenth century. This will be followed by an examination of the 
emergence, in the wake of the French Revolution, of a few terms of abuse 
employed by opponents of the Revolution to characterize those eighteenth- 
century movements that they saw as promoting the Revolution. An examina- 
tion of Stirling's claims about the development of English and German termi- 
nology will prepare the way for some concluding observations on the use and 
abuse of "Enlightenment" in characterizations of eighteenth-century thought. 
Translating AuJklarung 
We can take the first of the two definitions in the Oxford English Dictio- 
nary as unproblematic. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the use of 
"enlightenment" to designate a process of clarification is a comm~nplace. '~ 
This sense of the word develops independently of the German AuJklarung and 
has nothing to do with judgments about the alleged shallowness of French eigh- 
teenth-century philosophy. The OED finds "enlighten" (or the variant "in- 
lighten") used in religious discussions in the early sixteenth century, where it 
referred to a removing of the dimness or blindness from the eyes and, figura- 
tively, from the heart. It cites a number of examples from the latter part of the 
sixteenth century where the term is used in the sense of supplying "spiritual 
light." By the end of the seventeenth century the convention of using the verb 
"enlighten" to designate the activity of bringing "intellectual light" to bear on 
a subject is well established. A similar path of development can be traced for 
the German verb auJklaren and its nominalization die AuJklarung. Here too, 
the trajectory runs from an initial metaphorical usage in religious contexts to a 
more general sense of imparting wisdom, a banishing of mental darkness.20 
Our concern is with the second, and more problematic, of the OED's defi- 
nitions. It advances three claims: 1) that the English usage is modeled on the 
German Aufklarung; 2) that the English term refers, in the first instance, to 
philosophical tendencies in France; and 3) that the term carries with it a decid- 
l9 A search of the Chadwyck-Healey Literature Online database finds only one use of "en- 
lightenment" prior to 1825 but records 56 usages between 1825 and 1850, all of them classifiable 
as examples of the OED's first definition. It should be noted, however, that while this database is 
quite extensive (allowing for searches of 300,000 English texts), its coverage is limited to literary 
works: a number of the examples cited in the OED, for example, are not recorded. 
20 On the development of the German term, see Peter Putz, Die Deutsche Aufkarung 
(Darmstadt, 1978), 12-15, and Horst Stuke, "Aufklamng" in Geschichtlich Grundbegrzfe, ed. 
Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart, 1972), I, 243-342. For a brief 
sketch of the German development, see my article, "What Enlightenment Was: How Moses 
Mendelssohn and Irnmanuel Kant Responded to the Berlinische Monatsschrift," Journal of the 
History of Philosophy, 30 (1992), 79-80. 
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edly negative judgment on these philosophical tendencies. While the third of 
these claims has become a blte noir among dix-huitiemistes because of the 
ease with which it blends definition and defamation, this annoyance might be 
dismissed as a case of blaming the messenger if, in fact, the Oxford English 
Dictionary accurately conveyed nineteenth-century usage. After all, it is hardly 
surprising that Victorians disliked the Enlightenment. But the problem with the 
definition may be more serious: the connection with the German AuJklarung 
appears to be much more tenuous than the OED suggests. As we have seen, two 
of the three examples offered do not illustrate the meaning under which they 
are grouped. But might there be examples other than those mistakenly attrib- 
uted to Stirling where we can find the English "Enlightenment" used after the 
fashion of the German AuJklarung to refer, not to a process, but rather to a 
historical period? 
One obvious place to look for examples is in English translations of Ger- 
man histories of philosophy. Between 1856 (a decade prior to the appearance 
of Stirling's Secret ofHegel) and 1893 (four years after the publication of Caird's 
Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant) four histories of philosophy appeared 
in which the translators were faced with the task of coming up with a term for 
the historical period designated in the text as die AuJklarung. The first, from 
1856, was a translation of Albert Schwegler's Geschichte der Philosophie im 
Umriss (1847) by Julius H. Seelye, an American who was clearly confused by 
what to do with two chapters entitled "Die franzosische Aufklarung" and "Die 
deutsche Aufklarung." The choice of "The French Clearing Up" and "The Ger- 
man Clearing Up" suggests that Seelye had an understanding of German word 
stems, but few other clues as to what to do with the term.2' Two years after the 
publication of The Secret of Hegel, Stirling tried his hand at Schwegler, with 
somewhat less comic results. As might be expected from the pattern of usage 
established in The Secret ofHegel, the chapter titles are rendered as "The French 
Illumination" and "The German Il l~mination."~~ Seven years later, Friedrich 
Uebenveg's history of philosophy was translated by George S. Morris. The 
work offered a passing discussion of the French Aufklarung which Morris ren- 
dered into English as "the French 'illumination.' "23 Finally, in 1894, James H. 
Tufts employed "the philosophy of the Enlightenment" in his translation of 
Wilhelm Windelband's Geschichte der Ph i lo~oph ie .~~  But Tuft's translation 
21 Albert Schwegler, A History ofPhilosophy in Epitome, trans. Julius H .  Seelye (New York, 
1856), 205,227. 
22 Albert Schwegler, Handbook ofthe History ofPhilosophy, trans. and ann. James Hutchinson 
Stirling (Edinburgh, 1 89014 [first edition 1867]), 187, 207. 
23 Friedrich Uebenveg, History of Philosophy, From Thales to the Present Time, translated 
from the fourth German edition by George S. Morris (London, 1874), 11, 130. 
24 Wilhelm Windelband, History of Philosophy [1892], tr. James H. Tufts (New York, 1910 
[1893]), 438. 
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appeared five years after the example in the OED fiom Caird. At all points 
prior to Caird, translators who needed an equivalent for Aufklarung generally 
opted for "Illumination," not "Enlightenment." 
The convention of translating Aufklarung as "Illumination" was firmly es- 
tablished well before Stirling and his colleagues began their struggles with "the 
uncouth unintelligibleness" of that "extraordinary new German" which they 
confronted in the pages of Hegel's works.25 Translations appearing in The Ger- 
man Museum, a short-lived periodical that between January 1800 and July 1801 
translated a wide range of late eighteenth-century German texts into English, 
routinely rendered Aufklarung as "mental illumination." Thus, Georg Joachim 
Zollikofer's 1783 sermon "Der Werth der grossern Aufklarung der Menschen" 
appeared in The German Museum as "An Estimation of the Advantages arising 
from the Progress of Mental Illumination" and, in a listing of the most impor- 
tant German literature from the 1780s, the Berlinisches Journal der Aufklarung 
is referenced as The Berlin Journal, intended to promote mental I l l~mina t ion .~~  
There was, however, at least one place where the editors broke with this con- 
vention: a translation of Moses Mendelssohn's 1784 "Ueber die Frage: Was 
heisst Aufklarung?" opted for the phrase "enlightening the mind."27 
This use for "enlightening"-rather than the, to us, more familiar "enlight- 
enment"--can also be found in John Richardson's 1798 translation of Kant's 
essay "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklarung?" In his translation, the 
familiar opening of the essay reads: 
Enlightening is, Man's quitting the nonage occasioned by himself.. .. 

Sapere aude! Have courage to make use of thy own understanding is 

therefore the dictum of enlightening.28 

However peculiar this rendering may sound to our ears, Richardson's transla- 
tion-like those in The German Museum-faithfully captured a crucial feature 
of the late eighteenth-century usage. What Willi Goetschel has noted with re- 
spect to Kant can also be extended to Mendelssohn and Zollikofer: in their 
texts the term Aufklarung is employed as "a term of process," not as a designa- 
tion for a period.29 Thus, our examination of English translations ofAufklarung 
25  Stirling, Secret of Hegel, xvii. 
26 For Zollikofer see The German Museum (May 1800), I ,  396-403. For the reference to the 
Berlin Journal see the supplement to I, 590. For other translations of Aufkarung as mental 
illumination, see I, 77, 21 1, 304, 392,435. 
*'Moses Mendelssohn, "On Enlightening the Mind," The German Museum (July 1800), 11, 
39-42. 
*'Immanuel Kant, Essays and Treatises on Moral, Political, and Various Philosophical 
Subjects (London, 1798; repr. Bristol, 1993), 3. For a discussion of Richardson's translations, 
see Giuseppe Micheli's introduction to the 1993 reprint, xiii-liii. 
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has brought us to a point where neither the English "Enlightenment" nor the 
German Aufkarung designates a historical period. 
This result teaches us something about how concepts associated with his- 
torical periods develop. Reinhart Koselleck has noted that while Renaissance 
humanists "favored verbs and adjectival expressions" to refer to the process of 
renewal and awakening in which they saw themselves engaged, " 'Renaissance' 
first entered regular use during the Enlightenment."30 The terms employed by 
eighteenth-century enlighteners exhibit a similar pattern. While there was much 
talk in the eighteenth century about what the process of "enlightenment" might 
entail, and while there was a host of ways of categorizing the particular period 
in which this process was carried on-"a philosophical age," an "age of cri- 
tique," an "age of enlightenment," "an enlightened age"-the designation "the 
Enlightenment" is nowhere to be found. Perhaps this should come as no sur- 
prise: Minerva's owl, as Hegel reminds us, arrives to survey the scene only 
after the contestants have left the field. As the eighteenth century came to a 
close, a good deal about it remained hotly contested. 
Designating the Pathologies of the Age: Philosophists and Illuminizers 
At the beginning of Book I1 of his History of the French Revolution (1837), 
Thomas Carlyle pondered what to call the final decade before the Revolution: 
Shall we call it, what all men thought it, the new Age of Gold? Call it 
at least, of Paper; which in many ways is the succedaneum of Gold. 
Bank-paper, wherewith you can still buy when there is no gold left; 
Book-paper, splendent with Theories, Philosophies, Sensibilities-beau- 
tiful art, not only revealing Thought, but also so beautifully hiding from 
us the want of Th~ught !~ '  
"The Paper Age," the title Carlyle gave to Book I1 of the History, was much too 
clever to serve as a catch-phrase for the period in question and, in any case, was 
eventually abandoned in Carlyle's own narrative. When he needed to refer to 
those who populated this age of paper, he called them phi lo sop he^.^^ When he 
required a term for the system of thought that they embraced, he called it 
"philo~ophism."~~Close cousins etymologically, the two words came from dif- 
ferent worlds ideologically. 
'O Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics ofHistorica1 Time, trans. Keith Tribe 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 236. 
3'  Thomas Carlyle, The French Revolution: A His to~y([I8371 New York, 1934), 24. 
32 For example, "What wisest Philosophe, in this halcyon period, could prophesy that there 
was approaching, big with darkness and confusion, the event of events?" (24-25). 
33 For example, "Philosophism ... has got her Turgot made Controller-General ..." (34). 
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Since the middle of the eighteenth century, the group of French thinkers 
who made up what we call the Enlightenment had described the activity in 
which they were engaged simply as "philosophy." D'Alembert7s Elements of 
Philosophy entertained the prospect that the middle of his own century might, 
like the middle of other centuries before it, represent a turning-point in intellec- 
tual development; he suggested that his century might come to be known as 
"the century of phi l~sophy."~~ Diderot echoed this characterization in the entry 
he wrote on the idea of "encyclopedia" for the Encyclopkdie, claiming that the 
Encyclopkdie had played a fundamental role in transforming the eighteenth 
century into a ~i2clephilosophe.~~ But the eighteenth century was not unique in 
that regard. In the history of philosophy D'Alembert sketched in his Prelimi- 
nary Discourse to the Encyclopkdie, the eighteenth century is characterized as 
a time of "regeneration" following in the wake of a "long interval of igno- 
rance" that had, in turn, been preceded by "centuries of light" (siicles de 
l ~ m i i r e ) . ~ ~That the eighteenth century, like other centuries before it, might be 
a "century of light" was a hope shared by those who named themselves, after 
their predecessors in earlier centuries of light, "philosophes." But they were 
certainly under no illusion that they or their century had any exclusive claim to 
such titles.37 
"Philosophism" had a decidedly different pedigree. Coined by Catholic 
opponents of the philosophes, it was popularized in England in part through the 
Abbe Barmel's use of the term, in his widely read Memoires pour sewir a 
1 'histoire du Jacobinism (1797-98), to designate the principles shared by mem- 
bers of the conspiracy of philosophes, free-masons, and Illuminati that he saw 
as responsible for the French Revo l~ t i o n . ~~  "Philosophism [philosophisme]," 
34 D'Alembert, "Essai sur les klkments dephilosophie," in Oeuvres de D 'Alembert (Paris, 
1821), I ,  Part 1, 122. See the discussion in Ernst Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment 
(Princeton, 195 I), 3-6. 
''Diderot, "Encyclopedie," in Encyclopedie, Tome Cinquieme ([Paris, 17551, New York, 
1969'), 644a; see also 636a. For a discussion of the role that a consciousness of time plays in the 
Encyclopkdie, see Daniel Rosenberg, "An Eighteenth-Century Time Machine: The Encyclopedie 
of Denis Diderot," in Daniel Gordon (ed.), Postmodernism and the Enlightenment: New Per- 
spectives in Eighteenth-Century French Intellectual Histow (New York, 2001), 45-66. 
36 D'Alembert, Discours Prelirninaire in Encyclopedie Tome Premier (Paris, 1751), xix-xx. 
"Dumarsais's article "Philosophe" in Encyclopedie Tome Douzieme (Neufchastel, 1765), 
509-1 1, offers a quick sketch of how the Philosophes understood themselves. For a sense of how 
they used the termsphilosophe, philosophie, andphilosophique, consult the citations collected 
under the entries for these terms in the Encyclopedic's Table Analytique et Raisonnke, Tome 
Second (Paris, 1780), 434-35. 
"For discussions of early uses of the tern, see Darline Gay Levy, The Ideas and Careers of 
Simon-Nicolas-Henri Linguet: A Study ofEighteenth-Century French Politics (Urbana, Ill., 1980), 
179, and Jean Balcou, Frkron contre lesphilosophes (Paris, 1975), 185-88. For a discussion of 
Catholic opponents and their influence on the construction of "the Enlightenment," see Damn 
McMahon, Enemies ofthe Enlightenment; The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making 
of Modernity (New York, 2001). 
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he explained, "is the error of every man who, judging of everything by the 
standard of his own reason, rejects in religious matters every authority that is 
not derived from the light of nature."39 By the last years of the eighteenth cen- 
tury, the word was the favored term of abuse employed in the pages of conser- 
vative journals such as the Anti-Jacobin Review to refer to supporters of the 
French Revo l~ t i o n . ~~  A review of the English translation of Barmel's Memoirs 
offered the following etymology lesson: 
From philosophy sprang philosophism, a word which . . . signifies the 
love of sophism, the love of falsehood, as philosophy imparts the love 
of wisdom, the love of truth. In the Greek language the terms sophism 
and sophists sufficed to mark the abuse; in the French language, as in 
our own, this is not the case, because the sophists of modern times bear 
no resemblance to those of antiquity. The latter never disturbed the 
earth; the former endeavour to enslave it and to bring back the reign of 
chaos. Here then is a love of evil, and consequently much more than 
error.41 
Those who embraced "philosophism" were not "systematic infidels who .. . 
rallied around some positive dogma." Rather they were "men without any fixed 
principles, inconsistent in their conduct" bent on "establishing their empire on 
the ruins of the truths which they labour to destroy." Aiming at the annihilation 
"not only of the Christian religion, but of all positive religion whatever," 
philosophism thus represented "nothing more than scepticism applied to the 
leading principles of metaphysics, morality, and religion"; it was no older than 
the work of Pierre B a ~ l e . ~ ~  
The plague of "philosophism" had spread beyond France. According to the 
Anti-Jacobin Review, ever since Frederick the Great (or, as Banuel preferred to 
call him, "Frederick the Sophister") introduced French philosophy into his do- 
mains, philosophism had become "fashionable throughout Germany"; indeed, 
"ninety-nine out of every hundred German writers adopt the revolutionary jar- 
gon of the French."43 The Review found Germans to be troubling creatures 
39 Abbe Banuel, Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism, trans. Robert Clifford 
(Hartford, Conn., 1799), I, 2-3. 
40 For a discussion of the early history of the journal and its contributors, see Emily Lorraine 
de Montluzin, The Anti-Jacobins 1798-1800: The Early Contributors to the Anti-Jacobin Re- 
view (London, 1988). 
41 Anti-Jacobin Review, appendix to volume IV (August to December 1799), 560. The ex- 
planation of the etymology of "philosophism" was taken from J. F. de la Harpe, LycCe ou Cours 
de Litterature Ancienne et Moderne (Paris, 1800), VII, 195. 
42 Anti-Jacobin Review, appendix to IV, 56 1. 
43 Anti-Jacobin Review, appendix to 111 (May-August 1799), 552; for the characterization of 
Frederick, see Barmel, I, 99. 
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indeed. "A German writer," it informed its readers, "is, in general, a man that is 
discontented with every thing about him; his chief happiness, and glory con- 
sist in publishing a successful journal."44 In no land was the "itch for writing 
and publishing" so pervasive. One correspondent wrote that there were 
about eight or ten thousand persons in Germany who derive their live- 
lihood entirely, or the greater part of it, from scribbling, or, as they call 
it, enlightening the public mind.45 
In some German universities, the Review reported, "not a singleprofessor is to 
be found who dares admit the existence of a God." The Elector of Saxony, it 
reported, "has lately been obliged to suppress a periodical publication, written 
by professor Jena, entitled the Philosophical Journal, in which atheism was 
openly re~ornmended."~~ Subsequent articles in the Review recognized that Jena 
was, in fact, a town, not a person, and stated that the atheist "professor of phi- 
losophy, or, rather, of philosophism" was a man named "F~rchte."~~Accuracy 
was not one of the Review's strong points. 
While we tend today to think of the Enlightenment in Germany as a rather 
timid affair, the picture that emerges from the pages of the Anti-Jacobin Review 
was terrifying indeed. Here was a land where "upwards of 8,000 writers and 
scribblers of all descriptions . . . continually direct and lay siege to the public 
opinion"; where students "go about the country arrayed in Republican uni- 
forms" and band together in secret clubs "which are the scenes of perpetual 
broils, riots, and disorders"; where the low cost of college tuition allowed ev- 
ery farmer and burgher to train their sons to take up "the trade of book-mak- 
ing"; and where "the boundaries which separate virtue from vice appear to be 
entirely removed, and the best cement of society is consequently dis~olved."~~ 
In short, such a scene of corruption as Germany now exhibits, an En- 
glish mind shudders to contemplate. The young women, even of rank, 
uncontrolled by that natural diffidence, unchecked by that innate mod- 
esty, which at once heighten the allurements of, and serve as a protec- 
tion to, beauty, but which have been destroyed by the fatal infusion of 
philosophical principles, consider the age of puberty as the period of 
exemption from every social restraint, and sacrifice their virtue to the 
44 Anti-Jacobin Review, appendix to VI (April to August 1800), 566-67. 

45 Anti-Jacobin Review, appendix to V (January-April 1800), 573. 

46 Anti-Jacobin Review, I (December 1798), 729-3 1. 

47 Anti-Jacobin Review, preface to volume IV (August to December 1799), viii. The discus- 

sion of Fichte's dismissal was followed by criticisms of Schiller (xiii-xiv) and Goethe (xiv). 
Kant's system of philosophy was characterized as "extremely dangerous" in volume V (January-
April 1800), 339. 
48 Anti-Jacobin Review, 111, 553; preface to IV, ix, xii, xii-xiii. 
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first candidate for their favour, who has the means either of captivating 
their fancy, or gratifying their avarice; while the dreadful number of 
abortions serves to proclaim the frequency and extent of their crimes!49 
But of all the horrors that Germany unleashed on the world, none played as 
important a role in the imagination of the opponents of the Revolution as the 
Illuminati. 
Founded by Adam Weishaupt in Bavaria in 1776, the Illuminati flourished 
briefly in the early 1780s, combining Masonic rituals, egalitarian political ide- 
als, and an organizational structure that borrowed much from its arch-enemies, 
the J e s u i t ~ . ~ ~  It was suppressed by the Bavarian government in 1785 and its 
documents published, allowing the movement to attain a notoriety in legend 
that far exceeded its limited actual achievements. The movement figured promi- 
nently both in John Robinson's Proofs of a Conspiracy Against All the Reli- 
gions and Governments of Europe (1797) and in the third volume of Barruel's 
Memoirs. When the latter appeared in English in 1799, Robert Clifford, Barnel's 
translator, attached a footnote to the volume's "Preliminary Observations" which 
suggests the difficulties he had in finding words equal to the task of describing 
what the Illuminati sought to do. 
The translator thinks it proper to inform the Reader, that, considering 
how much the abuse of terms, such as of Philosophy, Reason, &c. &c. 
has contributed to diffuse the new-fangled doctrines, he has adopted in 
the present volume .. . the words Illuminee, Illuminize, and Illumini- 
zation, though Illuminate and Illumination might perhaps be more cor- 
rect expressions. Every reader will feel, that the illumination of the 
world, and to illuminate mankind, are objects worthy of the true phi- 
losopher. But may the man be ever accurst who shall attempt to 
illuminize his countrymen, or aim at the illuminization of the 
Clifford's concern with language echoed Barruel's own sense that much of the 
success of the conspiracy lay in its ability to redefine the meaning of words.52 
Indeed, what made the conspiracy of philosophists and illuminizers so insidi- 
ous was their ability to advance their program under the cover of a language 
49 Anti-Jacobin Review, IV, xii. 
50 For discussions of the movement, its suppression, and its prominence in conspiracy theo- 
ries, see Klaus Epstein, The Genesis ofGerman Conservatism (Princeton, 1966), 87-104, Rich- 
ard van Diilmen, The Society of the Enlightenment: The Rise of the Middle Class and Enlighten- 
ment Culture in Germany, trans. Anthony Williams (New York, 1992), 104-18, and Richard van 
Diilmen, Der Geheimbund der Illuminaten (Stuttgart, 1977), which includes a selection of docu- 
ments. 
Barmel, Memoirs, 111, vii. 
52 Amos Hofman, "Opinion, Illusion, and the Illusion of Opinion: Barmel's Theory of Con- 
spiracy," Eighteenth-Centuy Studies 27, 1 (1993), 49-50. 
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that seemed so innocent. For who could object to "philosophy," to "reason," or 
to the "illumination of the world"? 
For this reason, opponents of Jacobinism found it necessary to draw some 
distinctions. An antiJacobin poem entitled Bubble and Squeak, a Galli-maufry 
of British BeeJ with the Chopp'd Cabbage of Gallic Philosophy and Radical 
Reform sought to distinguish the "old" philosophy which, working together 
with religion, had sought "To humanize and bless mankind" from the new "Phi- 
losophy of Gallic climes / Parent of unexampled crimes!" 
Philosophy, of curst extraction, 

Whom infidelity and faction 

Evok'd from midnight darkness Stygian 

To plunder and proscribe religion, 

And half th' insensate globe ensnare 

With hollow smile and tinsel's glare: 

As Paphos' sov'reign meretricious 

Rose from the sea so fair and specious, 

Yet, spite of all that lovers swore, 

And poets lied, was but a ~ h - . ~ ~  

Likewise, Clifford chose to translate Barruel's sophiste as "sophister" rather 
than "sophist," explaining that he thought it important 
to distinguish the modern rebels from the Greek Philosophers of the 
school of Sophists. Johnson in his dictionary, defines SOPHISTER as 
a disputant fallaciously subtle; an artful but insidious logician; such is 
the species of men that have been described in this work, who, con- 
scious of their own fallacy, but acting the part of Satan to pervert man- 
kind, should never be confounded with those men of antiquity whose 
systems of disputation may have been fallacious, but whose intentions 
were upright, and who did not combat every sacred or social principle 
in hopes of subverting society.54 
But while considerable labors were devoted to the terms "philosophy," "soph- 
ist," and "illumination," "enlightenment" remained above the fray. 
Clifford used "enlighten" in a passage where Barruel had employed kclairer 
and employed "enlightened" to deal with an appearance of aufgeklarte in one 
of the Illuminati documents which Barruel quoted.5s Robinson, working his 
53 Quoted from the review in The Anti-Jacobin Review 111, 286-90. 

54 Barmel, Memoirs, IV, 342. 

55  For Cclairer see Barmel, Memoirs, I, 3 1 and 111, 183; for aufgeklarte see 111, 106.111, 11 8 

employs the image of the diffusion of light to deal with an appearance ofAuJklarung in another 
Illuminati document. 
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way through some Illuminati documents, offered a footnote that explained that 
the "only proper translation" of "Auffilarung" [sic] "would be clearing up, or 
enlightening" before finally deciding that "Instruction seems the single word 
that comes nearest to the precise meaning of A~ffilarung."~~ When the Anti- 
Jacobin Review, in a discussion of "Furchte," spoke of the "noble discoveries 
of this enlightened man," the second adjective, like the first, was used ironi- 
ally.^' Edmund Burke had employed the phrase "this enlightened age" a num- 
ber of times in his Reflections on the Revolution in France. But the passages in 
which the term is deployed-like much of the Reflections-are drenched in 
sarcasm and, in any case, he did not restrict the designation "enlightened" to 
the eighteenth century. Alluding to the execution of Charles I he observed sar- 
donically, "The last century appears to me to have been quite as much enlight- 
ened."58 In short: "philosophism" and "illumination" did most of the work in 
anti-Jacobin rhetoric; "enlightened" and "enlightenment" had, at best, a minor 
role. 
The image of the light of truth banishing the darkness of error was far too 
powerful a trope for opponents of the Revolution to surrender to their enemies. 
So they used it themselves. The frontispiece of the first volume of the Anti- 
Jacobin Review was an engraving by James Gillray entitled "A Peep into the 
cave of Jacobinism." It depicts a woman wearing a banner on which is in- 
scribed the word "Truth." Holding a torch in her hand, she enters the cave in 
which "Jacobinism"-a creature that is half-human and half-snake-sits sur-
rounded by books bearing the titles "atheism," "ignorances," "anarchy," "sedi- 
tion," and "libels." The light from Truth's torch not only frightens the creature 
in the cave (causing its mask to pop off, revealing the hideous face beneath); its 
rays also cause the equally monstrous books surrounding the creature to burst 
into flames. What is striking about the imagery employed in the engraving is 
how familiar it is. Change the name of the creature in the cave to "Jesuitism" 
and alter the titles on the books to "fanaticism," "enthusiasm," and "preju- 
dices" and the frontispiece could have been used on any number of Enlighten- 
ment journals. 
Thus, as the eighteenth century came to a close, the word "enlightenment" 
seems to have carried no negative connotations, even among those who we 
now regard as the Enlightenment's first opponents. "Illumination," however, 
56 John Robinson, Proofs of a Conspiracy ([1792], Boston, 1967), 174. However, on the 
next page he opts for "mental Illumination" as the translation for Aufklarung in a discussion of a 
text by Carl Friedrich Bahrdt. 
57 Preface to IV (August to December 1799), viii; the same is true of the characterization of 
Kant's followers as "enlightened" in the Appendix to V (January-April 1800), 569. 
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. J .  G.A. Pocock (Indianapo- 
lis, Ind., 1987), 57. A search of an electronic text edition of the Reflections confirms that while 
"enlighten" and "enlightened" occur frequently, Burke employs neither "the Enlightenment" 
nor, surprisingly, even "enlightenment." 
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was another story altogether. A letter from 12 November 1800 to the editor of 
The German Museum reported that 
the impositions ofAbbe Baruel [sic] and Robinson [sic] have had such 
an effect upon the minds of the reading community, that it will take 
some time to subvert the fabric which they have erected; for here in the 
North, the very word illumination conveys perfect horror to the mind, 
and he who professes himself a friend to mental illumination, is branded 
with the name of plotter against the state, and an underminer of moral- 
ity and religions.59 
At the dawn of the nineteenth century, opponents of the French Revolution had 
successfully saddled something called "the Illumination" with all the negative 
attributes that the Oxford English Dictionary would later associate with "En- 
lightenment." 
Shelving the AuJklarung 
In opting for "Illumination" as a translation for the German AuJklarung, 
Stirling and his colleagues were employing a term that carried considerable 
ideological baggage. Indeed, Sibree-who questioned whether the Illuminati 
existed-rejected the word in his translation of Hegel's Philosophy of History 
precisely because of these association^.^^ Stirling employed it, but-as we have 
seen- for much of the Preface to The Secret of Hegel simply left AuJklarung 
untranslated. Over thirty years later, in a footnote added in the second edition 
to the end of the Preface, he finally provided an explanation for his curious 
attachment to the German term. Noting that "in its ordinary use" the word meant 
simply "enlightenment-up lighting or lighting up," he referred the reader to 
an essay he had written in 1860 on Lord Macaulay, an essay which he claimed 
marked "the first British mention of a German word that is now somewhat 
~urrent."~'The notion that AuJklarung had become "somewhat current" prob- 
ably tells us more about Stirling's limited contact with those outside the pecu- 
liar circle of British Hegelians he inhabited than it does about mid-nineteenth- 
century English usage. But Stirling's discussion of the German term in his es- 
say on Macaulay is invaluable in explaining why he persisted in using a Ger- 
man word that would appear, at least to us, to have a rather straight-forward 
English translation. 
At one point in the essay, Stirling pondered what "system of thought" Hume 
was "held to represent" and suggested: 
59 The German Museum, I1 (December 1800), 521. 

60 Hegel, Philosophy ofHistory, 438. 

61 Stirling, The Secret ofHegel, Ixiii. 
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In one word, it is the philosophy of the eighteenth century. Now, to 
most of us, that one word is suggestive only of infidelity, free-thinking, 
deism, atheism, of scepticism in religion, of sensualism in philosophy, 
and of republicanism in politics. Still to apply any of these terms to the 
philosophy of the eighteenth century would be to name it badly, for, 
though the doctrines and opinions implied in such expressions are cer- 
tainly concomitants and attendants of that philosophy, they are, in real- 
ity, only phenomenal and temporary forms. English thinkers, which- 
ever side they have taken, have been content to remain with a very 
indistinct, obscure, and confused consciousness on these points; and 
the consequence is, that at this moment we know of no single really 
intelligent and fully enlightened discussion of this subject in the En- 
glish language. The Germans, on the contrary, have coolly turned upon 
it, lifted it, looked at it, and examined it piecemeal, till now, having at 
length fairly filled and satisfied themselves with what of instruction, 
negative or positive, they could extract from it, they have long since 
packed it up, and laid it on the shelf, labeled AuJklarung, a word which, 
meaning in its ordinary use simply enlightenment-up-lighting or light- 
ing up ....62 
Stirling went on to propose that the word might best be translated "with refer- 
ence at once to the special up-lighting implied, and a certain notorious exposi- 
tion of that up-lighting, the 'Age of Reason.' " 
For Stirling, then, AuJklarung was something more than a name for a pe- 
riod. It summarized a process of reflection and categorization that, while com- 
pleted in Germany, still remained to be accomplished in England. Stirling granted 
that there had been a series of "partial re-actions against the AuJklarung" in 
England, including a "Prudential Re-action" triggered by "Public considerations" 
(presumably a reference to British opponents of the French Revolution), a "Re- 
action of Poetry and Nature" (Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Shelley), and fi-
nally a "Germanico-Literary Reaction" (Carlyle and Emerson). But these reac- 
tions, he insisted, had never been carried to completion and had been over- 
whelmed by "a retrograde re-action-a Revulsion-and of the shallowest or- 
der, back to the AuJklarung again."63 The leading representatives of this "re- 
action" included Feuerbach and Buckle. As a result, the battle continued to 
rage in England between critics and advocates of the various "concomitants 
and attendants" of eighteenth-century philosophy in which both sides failed to 
grasp the animating principle that underlies and sustains "infidelity, free-think- 
ing, deism, atheism .. . scepticism in religion . . . sensualism in philosophy, and 
62 Stirling, "Lord Macaulay," 120-21. It might be noted that in this passage the adjective 
"enlightened" would appear to cany only positive connotations. 
63 Stirling, The Secret ofHegel, Ixii. 
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. . . republicanism in politics." In contrast, Germans had gained the requisite 
distance from these eighteenth-century controversies to see them as issuing 
from a single event and to comprehend the fundamental principle on which this 
event rested: "the right of private judgment." This, for Stirling, was what "re- 
ally constituted the spiritual attitude of humanity-its principle-in the eigh- 
teenth century."64 
Strange though Stirling's argument may appear initially, there is much to 
be said for it. Since the middle of the 1780s, when an article by Johann Friedrich 
Zollner in the Berlinische Monatsschrlft challenged readers to answer the ques- 
tion "Was ist Aufklarung?," Germans had been engaged in a protracted exami- 
nation of the nature, limits, and possible dangers of the process known as 
Aufk l~rung .~~The authors of these essays sought to weigh the implications of a 
process, not to define the characteristics of a period. Aufklarung had not yet- 
as Stirling would put it-been placed on the shelf. In Stirling's view, it was 
Hegel's great achievement to have done just that. 
Hegel was one of the first (if not the first) to use Aufklarung to designate a 
particular historical period, rather than an ongoing activity. His first, tenuous 
step in this direction was taken in the Phenomenology of Spirit. There Hegel 
employed Aufklarung to designate a cultural constellation that was preceded 
by the world of the "Self-Estranged Spirit" (a world which corresponds roughly 
to the Ancien Regime and whose bizarre contours come to life in Hegel's ac- 
count thanks to the Diderot's recently translated dialogue Rameau b Nephew) 
and followed by "Absolute Freedom and Terror" (Hegel's account of the French 
Revolution). While it is understandable that recent English translators of the 
Phenomenology, when rendering the title of this section, opt for "the Enlight- 
enrnent,"66 the translation is not without its problems. As P. N. Furbank has 
observed, just as the title of Mam's Das Kapital is conventionally translated as 
Capital rather than The Capital, there is no reason to suppose that die Aufkarung 
always needs to be rendered as "the Enlighten~nent."~' Much of the time "en- 
lightenment" will work quite nicely. It bears remembering that all the headings 
and subheadings in the section of the Phenomenology dealing with the cat- 
egory of "Spirit" are preceded by definite articles. Why, then, do translators 
who have successfully resisted the urge to turn der Geist into "the Spirit" or die 
64 Stirling, "Lord Macaulay," 212-22. See also Secret of Hegel, xxix. 
65 For a sketch of the different phases of the discussion of the question "What is enlighten- 
ment?" see my article, "What is Enlightenment? A Question, Its Context, and Some Conse- 
quences," in What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Ques- 
tions, ed. James Schmidt (Berkeley, 1996), 2- 15. 
66 This convention is followed both in A. V. Miller's translation (Oxford, 1977) and in the 
translation of chapter VI by the Toronto Hegel Group, Hegel, Spirit: Chapter Six of Hegel b 
Phenomenology, ed. Daniel E. Shannon (Indianapolis, Ind., 2001). 
67 P. N. Furbank, Diderot (New York, 1992), 450. 
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Moralitat into "the Morality" conclude that die AuJklarung must be "the En- 
lightenment"? 
J. B. Baillie's 1910 translation of the Phenomenology eschewed the defi- 
nite article, and the footnote Baillie appended to the section he titled simply 
"Enlightenment" suggests that he, free from the anachronistic assumption that 
Hegel was making a first stab at what Ernst Cassirer was later to achieve, may 
have had a better sense of what was going on in this section than later transla- 
tors. Baillie observed that the section should be understood as the outcome of 
the previous section's account of "Faith and Pure Insight," thus recognizing 
that there is a very close relationship between the concepts AuJklarung and 
reine Einsicht. Indeed, Hegel himself emphasized the connection in the defini- 
tion ofAuJklarung he offered at the start of the section devoted to "The Struggle 
between Enlightenment and Superstition." The passage in question appears as 
follows in Baillie's translation: 
The various negative forms which consciousness adopts, the attitude 
of scepticism, and that of theoretical and practical idealism, are infe- 
rior attitudes compared with that of pure insight and the expansion of 
pure insight-enlightenment.68 
"Enlightenment" thus denotes the spread of a stance towards the world that 
Hegel had earlier denoted as "pure insight." We are still dealing with a term 
that refers-like the first definition in the Oxford English Dictionary--to a 
process: the Phenomenology is concerned with the dissemination of a cogni- 
tive stance that manifested itself most explicitly in a particular geographical 
location (France) and at a particular historical period (the period leading up to 
the French Revolution). But the Phenomenology, for all of its historical allu- 
sions, was neither a philosophy of history nor even a history of philosophy. It 
was, as Hegel himself came to realize, a rather peculiar undertaking that at- 
tempted to use a historical narrative to resolve conceptual problems.69 
Hegel did not finally place AuJklarung "on the shelf" until two decades 
later when, in his lectures on the history of philosophy and the philosophy of 
history, the word is finally used to refer to a particular period in world history 
and to a particular period in the development of philosophy. His discussion of 
eighteenth-century philosophy in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy 
distinguished between the paths that the Enlightenment had taken in French 
and in German philosophy, thus laying out the basic framework that Schwegler, 
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Baillie) [Moldenauer and Michel edition, 4001. 
69 Shortly before his death Hegel attempted to revise the work, but he soon gave up, charac- 
terizing it as "a curious early work" whose arguments were much too closely bound to "the time 
of its composition" and, as such, incapable of revision. See Hegel's note in Hofkeister's edition 
of the Phenomenology (Hamburg, 1952), 578. 
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Uebenveg, and Windelband would subsequently follow. In the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History he emphasized the atypicality of the French experience 
and stressed that they were cursed with a philosophy that could not help but 
remain "formal" and "abstract" since it sprung from a culture that had never 
undergone a Reformation. As a result, the French Enlightenment was thrown 
into a struggle against both Church and State, while in Germany Enlighten- 
ment was carried out "on the side of theology" and was thus more favorably 
disposed towards the political and social order that confronted it.70 Hegel's later 
discussion of the relationship between enlightenment and revolution thus of- 
fered something that reads much more like conventional history than the often 
puzzling movement of categories that animates the Phenomenology. In his Ber- 
lin lectures, Hegel was aware of the diversity of forms that the Enlightenment 
had taken and the unique set of circumstances that produced the French Revo- 
lution. He was able to do this because he knew, as he could not when he was 
struggling to complete the Phenomenology even as Napoleon's armies closed 
in on Jena, that both the Enlightenment and the French Revolution were over. 
Dusk had fallen and it was safe for Minerva's owl to take flight. 
Conclusion: Enlightenment as Period and as Process 
It seems, then, that Stirling may-in part-have gotten it right: the trans- 
formation of a process known as "enlightenment" into a period known as "the 
Enlightenment" moved at a different pace in Germany and in Britain. The trans- 
formation was well underway by the time Hegel delivered his Berlin lectures 
on the philosophy of history and the history of philosophy. For the rest of the 
century, Aufklarung would have a long and productive career in German histo- 
ries of philosophy. From the middle of the nineteenth century onward, English 
translators of these histories and of Hegel's own works struggled to find En- 
glish equivalents for this curious German word, initially employing the politi- 
cally charged term "the Illumination" but, by the end of the century, settling on 
"the Enlightenment," a word which-as Stirling noted in 1898--carried none 
of the connotations of "infidelity" that Germans associated with the term 
A~Jk larung .~~  
A watershed of sorts was reached in 1910 with the publication of John 
Grier Hibben's The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, the first study of eigh- 
teenth-century philosophy to employ "Enlightenment" in its title.72 Hibben, an 
American Hegelian, offered a sensible, comprehensive account of eighteenth- 
century thought, free from the prejudices and distortions that the definition in 
the Oxford English Dictionary associated with the term. Indeed, twenty years 
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before Ernst Cassirer's similarly titled work, Hibben produced a survey that 
exhibits many of the virtues of Cassirer's now-classic ac~ount . '~  Far from car- 
rying-as the OED would have it-an "implied charge of shallow and preten- 
tious intellectualism, unreasonable contempt for tradition and authority," at the 
end of the nineteenth century the designation "the Enlightenment" had the vir- 
tue, unlike "the Illumination," of steering clear of the political polemics of the 
later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. While "the Enlightenment" might 
still be criticized for its shortcomings, it was-unlike "the Illumination"-not 
something to be feared and despised. 
Twentieth-century discussions of "the Enlightenment" did not, however, 
follow the course that Stirling projected: "the Enlightenment" has not remained 
on the shelf. Critics of various persuasions continue to feel the need to take it 
down from time to time and bash it around a bit. Despite the best efforts of its 
admirers, it has come to serve as a convenient scape-goat on which those who 
feel ill at ease in the modern world can vent their frustrations. At the same time, 
historians working in the area of eighteenth-century studies have found them- 
selves in need of more shelf space. The cubby hole which once held "the En- 
lightenment" has not proved capacious enough for the various Enlightenrnents- 
"high and low," "radical and moderate," French, German, Scottish, Austrian, 
Italian, and English-that have come into prominence over the last half cen- 
t ~ r y . ' ~Those who have been taking "the Enlightenment" off the shelf to slap it 
have paid little attention to those who have been finding that "the Enlighten- 
ment" does not really fit into the slot into which it was crammed at the close of 
the nineteenth century. Those who have been busy finding new species of en- 
lightenment in places where its presence was, at best, a rumor, have under- 
standably devoted little time to defending "the Enlightenment" from its critics. 
The very notion that there was a single thing called "the Enlightenment" ap- 
pears, more and more, to be an illusion best left to the fevered brains of those 
whose approach to the eighteenth century seems to owe more to the Abbe Barmel 
and John Robison than it does to anything that might pass muster as history. 
Why attempt to defend "the Enlightenment" from criticism when the notion 
that there was such a thing as "the Enlightenment" begins to look suspiciously 
like a red herring that a group of English Hegelians somehow managed to 
smuggle into the OED? 
Yet, if a certain amount of skepticism may be warranted about "the En- 
lightenment," the reader of eighteenth-century texts will, nevertheless, some- 
times find passages that prompt an appreciation for the process known as "en- 
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lightenment." Let us close with one example. The second volume of Rich- 
ardson's 1798-99 collection of Kant's Essays and Treatises on Moral, Politi- 
cal, and Various Philosophical Subjects opened with a translation of Kant's 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautful and the Sublime, a text that reiter- 
ated, without comment, David Hume's doubts that it would be possible to pro- 
duce "a single example where a Negro has shown talents." At this point in his 
translation Richardson inserted a footnote that reads: 
During the American rebellion the translator knew in South Carolina a 
Negro physician of reputation; and in Antigua a heaven-born Negro 
preacher, without shoes and stocking^.'^ 
It is a brief note, perhaps scarcely worth noting, and certainly not the sort of 
indulgence that a translator would be permitted today. Yet there is something 
touching in Richardson's gesture, both for what it suggests about how he un- 
derstood his relationship to the text he was translating and for what it suggests 
about the age in which he lived. Richardson took the challenge that Hume posed 
and that Kant passed on as something that he ought to address. An empirical 
claim had been made, and Richardson knew that he was in a unique position to 
respond to it. For he, unlike Hume and Kant, had once lived in that strange land 
called America and, while there, had met Negroes whose talents could not be 
denied. So he mentioned them. From the little we know about Richardson, he 
does not appear to have had an "unreasonable contempt" for authority-he was 
horrified by the French Revolution and he had enough respect for Kant not to 
bother him with too many questions about how to go about translating his writ- 
i n g ~ . ~ ~But he did seem to think that getting facts right mattered, that false 
claims needed to be refuted, and that in the cosmopolitan world of readers and 
writers that formed the republic of letters, translators had an obligation to talk 
back to texts if such conversation might push back the barriers of prejudice and 
ignorance. Had Kant been able to read what Richardson had written, one hopes 
that he would have appreciated his able translator's comment for what it was: 
an example of the "public use of reasonn-the touchstone of the activity that 
Kant called "enlightenment." 
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